We analyze existence, uniqueness and properties of equilibria in incompletely discriminating Tullock contests with logistic contest success functions, when contestants are risk averse. We prove that a Nash equilibrium for such a contest exists, but give an example of a symmetric contest with both symmetric and asymmetric equilibria, showing that risk aversion may lead to multiple equilibria. Symmetric contests have unique symmetric equilibria but additional conditions are necessary for general uniqueness. We also study the e¤ects on incumbents of additional competitors entering the contest under these 1 conditions and examine the e¤ects of risk aversion on rent dissipation in symmetric and asymmetric contests.
Introduction
Incompletely discriminating contests are widely used to analyze the consequences of rent-seeking behavior. In such a contest, contestants compete to win an indivisible rent with a common value to all contestants. Competition takes the form of choosing a level of expenditure and the pro…le of expenditure levels determines the probabilities of winning through a contest success function 1 . The payo¤ of the winner is the value of the rent to that contestant net of the expenditure on rent seeking. The payo¤ of losers is the negative of their expenditure. This results in a simultaneous-move game in which strategies are expenditure levels, a player's payo¤ is her expected utility and we seek Nash equilibria. Such contests were introduced by Tullock [29] in part as a response to the competitive approach to rent seeking, which concluded that the whole value of the rent would be dissipated in rent-seeking activity. In these contests, dissipation is reduced both through strategic e¤ects and as a consequence of the technology implicit in the contest success function. The study of such contests has blossomed into an extensive literature. Nitzan [19] and, more recently, Konrad [15] o¤er valuable surveys.
Most of the contest literature assumes that contestants are risk neutral. However, a number of authors have investigated the e¤ects of risk aversion. Motivated partly by the dissipation research agenda, many of these papers compare equilibria under risk aversion with the corresponding contest in which players are risk neutral and investigate whether risk aversion reduces total expenditure on rent seeking. An early example is Hillman and Katz [11] . who work largely within the competitive paradigm characteristic of the early literature but also discuss some strategic issues in an appendix. They use a Taylor's series expansion to derive an expression for limiting rent dissipation in a symmetric contest when the rent is small, and adopt numerical methods to obtain some extensions of this to larger rents. Long and Vousden [16] discuss comparative statics and extensions to endogenous and divisible rents. Millner and Pratt [17] , focussing on symmetric two-player contests, pointed out that risk-aversion need not reduce rent dissipation unless further restrictions are imposed on utility functions. Konrad and Schlesinger [14] show that this ambiguity extends to symmetric contests with any …nite number of players and elucidate it by decomposing the risk e¤ects of an increase in expenditure into a mean-preserving spread and contraction. These observations are in line with discussions of the e¤ects of risk aversion on strategic e¤ects in a wider class of games made by Skaperdas [24] and Grad-stein [10] . Millner and Pratt also noted that, if the third derivative of the utility function is positive 2 , risk aversion will reduce equilibrium rent-seeking and carried out an experiment, the results of which were consistent with such a reduction. Their theoretical result was extended to more than two players in a recent note of Treich [28] . Existence of a Nash equilibrium was investigated by Skaperdas and Gan [26] , who derived necessary and su¢ cient conditions for an equilibrium in two-player contests with constant absolute risk aversion and showed that, in some circumstances, risk aversion reduces expenditure on rent seeking. Cornes and Hartley [4] established existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in an asymmetric contest in which the coef…cient of absolute risk aversion of contestants was constant. Bozhinov [3] extended this to constant relative risk aversion, but with a restriction on the size of the ratio of the size of the rent to initial wealth 3 . Cornes and Hartley also show that, given two otherwise identical contestants, the expenditure of the less risk averse contestant is greater and that global reductions in risk aversion increased aggregate lobbying. They also developed a formula for rent dissipation in a large symmetric contest and pointed out that selection e¤ects in large contests may eliminate the more risk averse contestants, thereby partially o¤setting the reduction in rent dissipation caused by risk aversion. Münster [18] studied the e¤ects of risk aversion when contestants do not know how many other potential contestants have entered the contest. This leads to a game of incomplete information. Here, we con…ne the analysis to contests with complete information.
One focus of the general contest literature has been the existence and uniqueness of a pure-strategy equilibrium [27] , [5] . With the exception of the special cases examined by Skaperdas and Gan [26] , Cornes and Hartley [4] and Bozhinov [3] , little attention has been paid to existence and uniqueness of equilibria in general contests with risk averse contestants. Indeed, most articles consider only symmetric equilibria of symmetric contests. Existence is complicated by inevitable discontinuities in payo¤s at the origin (zero expenditure by all contestants.) Nevertheless, we show how other methods can be used to prove existence of an equilibrium for a wide class of contest success functions (those studied by Szidarowszky and Okuguchi [27] ). If the contest is symmetric, it will have a unique symmetric equilibrium. However, we cannot rule out the possibility that such contests also have asymmetric equilibria, nor of multiple equilibria of general contests. In particular, we present a symmetric example with a "proportional"contest success function (in which the probability that a contestant wins is equal to the ratio of the expenditure of that contestant to total expenditure) which possesses both symmetric and asymmetric equilibria. This shows that additional conditions (which we call "regularity") are needed to ensure uniqueness and a number of such conditions are exhibited in the sequel. All these conditions impose an upper bound on the curvature of the utility function and we show that this bound is always satis…ed when the rent is small enough. In the case of constant relative risk aversion, we can give an explicit value for the rent, below which the contest admits a unique equilibrium. Cornes and Hartley [4] show that constant absolute risk aversion is su¢ cient for regularity and here we show that this remains true if the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion is non-increasing provided this coe¢ cient is not too large.
Comparative statics of contests have also been widely studied. For example, Long and Vousden [16] investigate contests in which contestants are risk averse and the rent is divisible. Nti [21] studies comparative statics for symmetric contests with risk-neutral contestants. For reasons of space, we restrict our analysis to the e¤ects of entry, but permit the contestants to be risk-averse. In a symmetric contest, we show that, under the general conditions discussed above, entry reduces expenditure of incumbents in the symmetric equilibrium. In regular asymmetric contests, entry increases aggregate lobbying and decreases the probability that incumbents win as well as their payo¤s in equilibrium.
We can use these results to analyze the e¤ects of risk aversion on rent dissipation. Study of this issue was initiated by Tullock [29] , who observed that strategic e¤ects in a symmetric contest with n contestants reduce the proportion of the rent dissipated from 1 under competition to (at most) 4 (n 1) =n. A number of factors may further reduce rent dissipation, including asymmetry and the technology embodied in the contest success function [5] 5 . For asymmetric contests with risk-averse contestants, we consider the case of contestants who are prudent and not too large (as measured by their equilibrium probability of winning.) Aggregate lobbying e¤ort is smaller in such a contest than in a second contest with the same contest success function but risk-neutral contestants. This extends the recent result of Treich [28] for symmetric contests. When there are many contestants, the reduction in dissipation caused by strategic e¤ects vanishes ((n 1) =n approaches 1) and studying the limit n ! 1 allows us to focus directly on the impact of risk aversion on rent dissipation. For symmetric contests, we derive an expression for the limiting dissipation ratio (proportion of the rent dissipated in equilibrium) in terms of the utility function. Special cases of this expression include the "small rent" formula of Hillman and Katz [11] as well as the limiting dissipation ratio found by Cornes and Hartley for the case of constant absolute risk aversion [4] . As in that paper, this limiting value is equal to one under risk neutrality and is strictly less than one under strict risk aversion. Furthermore, if two symmetric contests share the same contest success function but contestants in the second are more risk averse (in the Arrow-Pratt sense) than the …rst, then limiting rent dissipation is higher in the …rst contest.
Cornes and Hartley also studied the interaction between asymmetry in contests and risk aversion. Since asymmetry can also reduce rent dissipation, it might be expected that the reductions due to risk aversion and asymmetry will reinforce each other. However, the opposite will be true in large contests. With the proportional contest success function and many contestants exhibiting constant but di¤erent coe¢ cients of risk aversion, competition will drive the more risk averse contestants out of the contest, leaving only the least risk averse contestants to participate actively in the contest. In the limit, rent dissipation approaches that associated with the smallest coe¢ cient of risk aversion. With a more general contest success function, the story is a little more complicated: which contestants are inactive will depend on the contest success function as well as attitudes to risk. However, qualitative conclusions are essentially unchanged. Selection e¤ects mean that, typically, the active contestants in a large contest exhibit the same attitudes to risk and success probability. This allows us to apply results derived for symmetric contests to large asymmetric contests.
To obtain these results we need a tractable characterization of Nash equilibria. The natural characterization is as a …xed point of the bestresponse mapping, but this mapping is multi-dimensional, which makes it hard to handle directly and for this reason, the existing literature on incompletely discriminating contests with risk aversion, except [4] , assumes either symmetry or two contestants (or both). Instead, we use an alternative characterization in terms of share correspondences. This methodology was …rst discussed in [5] , building on the share functions used in [4] to study contestants with constant absolute risk aversion and is ultimately derived from an approach to Cournot equilibrium pioneered by Selten [23] . The advantage of the approach is that much of the analysis is unidimensional. The method works because the game is aggregative (payo¤s depend on own strategy and aggregate strategy) or, when contest success functions are not proportional, the contest is strategically equivalent to an aggregative game. This approach may have independent interest for other applications which can be modelled as aggregative games, including a number of extensions of the basic contest model.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we describe how the contest may be modelled as a simultaneous-move game and present an example which has a symmetric proportional contest success function and identical risk averse contestants yet possesses multiple equilibria. In the following section, we formally de…ne share correspondences, derive some of their properties and establish existence of a Nash equilibrium. In Section 4, we …rst discuss uniqueness of symmetric equilibria of symmetric contests and then turn to additional conditions for ensuring a unique equilibrium of a general contest. In the following section, we study the e¤ects of entry on equilibria, in both symmetric and asymmetric contests. In Section 6, after a brief look at small contests, we go on to develop an expression for the dissipation ratio for large symmetric contests and then extend this result to asymmetric contests. Section 7 concludes and proofs postponed from the main body of the text are given in the Appendix.
Setup and counterexample
We study a contest with n( 2) contestants of whom contestant i chooses to spend x i 2 R + to in ‡uence the probability of winning an indivisible rent of value R. The expenditure x i purchases lobbying e¤ort f i (x i ) where f i can be thought of as the production function of contestant i. We assume that all production functions are increasing and that production exhibits non-increasing returns.
A1
The production function f i is continuous, twice continuously di¤eren-tiable in R + , and satis…es
It is convenient to write x 2 R n + for the strategy pro…le (x 1 ; : : : ; x n ) and we study contests with a single winner, in which the probability p i (x) that contestant i wins is proportional to lobbying e¤ort:
This 'logistic'contest success function is widely used in the study of contests and was given an axiomatic foundation by Skaperdas [25] .
for all i, we refer to the contest success function as proportional. In cases where f i is not de…ned for negative arguments, we interpret derivatives at the origin as one-sided and permit a limiting value of +1. This allows us to incorporate production functions such as f i (x) = x r where 0 < r 1, originally studied by Tullock [29] and in which the marginal product is unbounded.
We also suppose that contestants are risk averse or risk neutral with a concave Bernoulli utility function u i for contestant i, which satis…es the following conditions. Given a strategy pro…le x 6 = 0, contestant i faces a gamble: win R x i with probability p i , lose x i , otherwise. In this case, we take the payo¤ of contestant i to be her expected utility:
If the pro…le is x = 0, we suppose that there is no winner and therefore take e i (0) = u i (0) for all i 6 . This de…nes an n-player simultaneous-move game in which player i has strategy set R + 7 and payo¤ e i . Note that e i is discontinuous at the origin. Unfortunately, there is no way to de…ne payo¤s for all contestants that is continuous or even upper semicontinuous at the origin and that also respects the assumption that there is at most one winner 8 . This discontinuity at the origin implies that at least 6 A natural alternative assumption is that every contestant wins with probability 1=n when x = 0. This makes no di¤erence to our results. 7 Since strategies exceeding R are strictly dominated, we can take the strategy set to be [0; R] without loss of generality. Indeed, there may be utility functions satisfying A2 only for c R, for which this may be the natural strategy set. 8 The condition that there is at most one winner can be expressed as
Any attempt to de…ne payo¤s at the origin that are upper semi-continuous for all contestants and consistent with this inequality will encounter a contradiction. For, if x j = 0 for j 6 = i, the payo¤ of contestant i is u i (R x i ) and this approaches u i (R) as x i ! 0.
Upper semi-continuity of e i at 0 would dictate e i (0) u i (R) for all i, but this would violate the displayed inequality at x = 0 (and introduce 0 as a spurious equilibrium). two contestants must be active (choose positive x i ) in any Nash equilibrium. Indeed, if only contestant i were active, we would have x i = 0. But then, arg max x i e i (x i ; x i ) would be empty, contradicting the de…nition of equilibrium. The discontinuity also prevents us from direct use of standard existence theorems (e.g. the Debreu-Fan-Glicksberg pure-strategy existence theorem [7] ). The fact that payo¤s are not even upper semi-continuous prevents direct application of pure-strategy existence theorems such as those of Dasgupta and Maskin [6] , which permit discontinuous payo¤s. We return to this issue in the next section, where we prove that, nevertheless, A1 and A2 are su¢ cient to ensure existence of a Nash equilibrium.
When all players are risk neutral, this game is strategically equivalent to Cournot oligopoly with unit elastic demand and non-decreasing marginal costs. It is well known that such a game not only has a Nash equilibrium but that the equilibrium is unique [27] , [5] . However, as the following counterexample shows, this result does not survive if risk neutrality is relaxed to risk aversion.
Example 1 Consider the 10-player contest, in which, for all i, we have f i (x) = x for x 0 and u i satis…es 9 u i (c) = c 0:45c 2 for 0 c 1. Assumption A1 obviously holds for all contestants and simple computation shows that A2 is satis…ed with the displayed utility function. Direct calculation can be used to verify that this symmetric contest has a symmetric Nash equilibrium in which x i = 0:0563 for all i. (Numerical values throughout this example are given to three signi…cant …gures.) However, this equilibrium is not unique. For example, there are also asymmetric equilibria in which any three contestants choose x i = 0:184 and the remaining seven contestants choose x i = 0.
For analytical purposes it is helpful to rewrite the game using lobbying e¤ort as strategic variable. Since f i is strictly increasing,
exists, is twice continuously di¤erentiable in R + and satis…es g i (0) = 0 and g 0 i 0 and g 00 i 0. Write y i = f i (x i ) and Y = P n j=1 y j for aggregate lobbying. Then we can rewrite the payo¤ of contestant i as
for 0 y i Y , where
provided Y > 0. Since x = 0 cannot be an equilibrium, Y is positive in all equilibria. Note that the transformed game is aggregative: each contestant's payo¤ depends only on their own strategy and the sum of all strategies, a fact we exploit throughout the development.
Share correspondences
Our analysis is rooted in the notion of a share correspondence. It extends the "…tting-in function"used by Selten [23] , Bamón and Frayssé [1] , Novshek [20] and others to study Cournot equilibrium and other aggregative games. The share correspondence of contestant i, denoted S i , is a mapping from R ++ to subsets of [0; 1]. Fix the payo¤ of contestant i to be i (y i ; Y ) and consider all aggregative games in which i is a player. Consider further, all equilibrium strategy pro…les of such a game in which aggregate lobbying e¤ort is Y . Let S i (Y ) denote the set of probabilities that contestant i wins in such an equilibrium:
y is a Nash equilibrium with
Share correspondences can be used to study equilibria using the readilyproved fact that b y is a Nash equilibrium if and only if b
Equivalently, a necessary and su¢ cient condition (using standard set addition) for b Y to be an equilibrium value of aggregate lobbying in the contest is
If this holds and
Y is a Nash equilibrium. Share correspondences can be characterized in terms of best-response mappings: Since the best response of contestant i to the strategy pro…le y i depends only on Y i = P j6 =i y j , we can write the best-response correspondence as
for any Y i 0. The share correspondence satis…es
We can use …rst-order conditions to rewrite this characterization since payo¤s are quasi-concave functions of y i for …xed Y i 0. (The proof is in the appendix.)
From (2), the marginal payo¤ can be written:
where
It follows from Lemma 3.1 that y i 2 B i (Y i ) if and only if the right hand side of (6) is non-positive and equal to zero if y i > 0. Hence,
where i is the marginal payo¤ expressed in terms of aggregate lobbying and share:
Note that i (Y; 1) < 0 for any
2 (0; 1) and this puts 2 S i (Y ). We conclude that share correspondences are non-empty for all Y > 0. The following lemma, proved in the appendix, gives more information on these correspondences. 
3. if (10) does not hold, 1
We refer to Y i as the dropout value of contestant i. Note that, if f 0 i (0) = 1, the dropout value is in…nite and the second part of the lemma has the following corollary.
Corollary 3.1 Assume A1 and A2 hold for contestant i and f
Corollary 3.1 applies, for example, to all contestants in a Tullock contest in which f i (x) = x r for all i, for some 0 < r < 1. With this contest success function, every contestant will be active in equilibrium.
We can also use Lemma 3.2 to deduce properties of S i (Y ) for small and large Y which will be useful in the sequel. In particular, the correspondence "approaches 1"as Y ! 0 and "approaches 0"as Y ! 1, in the sense of the following corollary, which follows directly from the …rst and third parts of the lemma. It follows that all values in the image of the aggregate correspondence P n j=1 S j exceed 1 for small enough Y and fall below 1 for all large enough Y . Existence turns on whether there is an intermediate value of Y at which (5) holds and therefore an equilibrium exists. The proof of the following theorem may be found in the appendix. It is instructive to compare this theorem with the existence results of Skaperdas and Gan [26] . These authors consider contests with more general contest success functions than ours but with only two contestants, both exhibiting constant absolute risk aversion. With our contest success function, Skaperdas and Gan's su¢ cient conditions for existence are a special case of Theorem 3.1. In particular, constant absolute risk aversion can be relaxed to simple risk aversion.
Uniqueness
Example 1 shows that A1 and A2 are insu¢ cient on their own to exclude the possibility of multiple equilibria. In this section, we explore additional conditions for uniqueness.
Symmetric contests
We …rst consider symmetric equilibria of symmetric contests, noting that such equilibria are widely studied in the literature on contests. All contestants must be active in a symmetric equilibrium and win with probability 1=n, so a necessary and su¢ cient condition for b Y to be the value of aggregate lobbying in a symmetric equilibrium is that 1=n 2 S b Y , where S is the common share correspondence of all contestants. In the Appendix, we use the …rst order conditions to show that this occurs for exactly one value of b Y .
Theorem 4.1 A symmetric contest in which A1 and A2 hold for all contestants has a unique symmetric equilibrium.
The applicability of this result is limited. Firstly, the contest must be symmetric. Even then, Example 1 shows that the contest may have multiple equilibria and a selection argument is needed to justify choosing the symmetric equilibrium, noting that every contestant may prefer some asymmetric equilibrium 10 . For this reason, we now relax the restriction to symmetric equilibria.
General contests
Multiple equilibria can arise in two ways. Firstly, there can be several equilibria sharing a common value of Y . This is always the case where a symmetric contest has asymmetric equilibria as in Example 1. The second possibility, also illustrated by Example 1, is that di¤erent equilibria correspond to di¤erent values of Y . However, if S i (Y ) is a singleton for all positive Y , multiple equilibria of the …rst type are obviously ruled out. In such a case, the correspondence de…nes a share function s i , where
Y is an equilibrium value of aggregate 10 It is straightforward to verify numerically that the payo¤ to an active player in the asymmetric equilibrium described in Example 1 is higher than that in the symmetric equilibrium.
lobbying if and only if
This entails a unique equilibrium pro…le:
In a general aggregative game, multiple equilibria of the second type are still possible, but in contests with risk-averse (or risk-neutral) contestants, this cannot happen. This is a consequence of the following lemma, characterizing a number of useful properties of the share function and proved in the Appendix. 
When a share function s i exists for every contestant, it follows from the …rst and second parts of the lemma that the aggregate share function P n j=1 s j is a continuous function that is strictly decreasing where positive. Furthermore, the third and fourth parts imply that it approaches n as Y ! 0 and approaches or is equal to zero as Y ! 1. We may conclude that (11) holds for exactly one value of b Y and therefore the contest has a unique Nash equilibrium. 
Regularity
In this subsection, we present su¢ cient conditions for regularity. Rather than impose additional restrictions on production functions, we focus on attitudes to risk and seek conditions on u i that ensure regularity for all production functions satisfying A1. In [4] , Cornes and Hartley show that a contestant whose preferences are characterized by constant absolute risk aversion is regular. Bozhinov [3] extends this result to contests in which players exhibit constant relative risk aversion, but at the cost of imposing restrictions on initial wealth and the size of the rent. In Example 1, contestants are not regular, but exhibit increasing absolute risk aversion. These results suggest that non-increasing absolute risk aversion may be su¢ cient for regularity, but this conjecture remains to be settled. Note that prudence [9] (convex marginal utility), whilst implied by decreasing absolute risk aversion, is not itself su¢ cient for regularity. Indeed, the marginal utility in Example 1 is (weakly) convex. Furthermore, it is straightforward to perturb the utility function slightly in this example to construct a contest with multiple equilibria and strictly prudent contestants. In the remainder of this section, we present a su¢ cient condition for regularity and then show that it is satis…ed for constant relative risk aversion, provided the rent satis…es an upper bound and for decreasing absolute risk aversion provided that the coe¢ cient of risk aversion is not too large.
Our principal su¢ cient condition imposes a restriction on the curvature of the utility function over the interval (0; R). The proof may be found in the appendix.
Lemma 4.2 If
for all x 2 (0; R), contestant i is regular.
To illustrate the application of this lemma, we consider the case of constant relative risk aversion:
where i > 0 and i 6 = 1.
Here, I i is the initial wealth of contestant i. If i = 1, we take u i = ln (I i + c).
We assume I i > R and restrict strategies to [0; R], ensuring that I i x i > 0 for all non-dominated strategies. In this case,
We deduce that d i is minimized in [0; R] at x = 0 or x = R, so the condition in Lemma 4.2 holds if d i (0) 0 and d i (R) 0. The …rst of these inequalities can be re-arranged to R 2
Similarly,
where the second inequality can be justi…ed by rearranging
The following corollary summarizes this conclusion.
Corollary 4.1 If A1 and A2 hold for contestant i and u i is given by (12) , where
This result shows that, if the size of the rent is not too large, the contest will have a unique Nash equilibrium. Such a result is true for more general utility functions, though we may not always be able to give an explicit formula for the bound on R. To support this claim, suppose that
is a continuous function of R. It is also positive for R = 0 and therefore for all su¢ ciently small R < I i . It follows that the condition in Lemma 4.2 holds for such R.
Corollary 4.2 Suppose that
, where I i > 0 and h i is concave and continuously di¤erentiable for positive arguments. Then there is R 2 (0; I i ) such that contestant i is regular for all R < R.
The intuition behind this corollary is that risk-neutral contestants are regular and behavior for small gambles is approximately risk neutral. The corollary provides a formal demonstration of the smoothness implicit in this argument. Additionally, if the form of h i is known, it may be possible to use Lemma 4.2 to derive an explicit expression for R.
We conclude this section with another corollary of Lemma 4.2.
Corollary 4.3 If A1 and A2 hold for prudent contestant i and the coe¢ -cient of absolute risk aversion of this contestant does not exceed 1=2R for any wealth level between R and R, contestant i is regular.
Recall prudence means marginal utility is convex and therefore u 00 i (c 1 ) u 00 i (c 2 ) whenever c 1 c 2 . Hence, for any x 2 (0; R),
using the bound on the coe¢ cient of risk aversion for the …nal inequality. Regularity follows from Lemma 4.2. The fact that no upper bound is necessary when the coe¢ cient of risk aversion is constant [4] , suggest that the bound is not the best possible.
Entry
The approach used to study equilibrium existence and uniqueness can be adapted to analyze comparative statics, particularly with respect to the number of contestants. In this section, we discuss the e¤ects on the equilibrium of adding and removing contestants.
Symmetric contests
We …rst consider symmetric equilibria of symmetric contests. A general investigation of comparative statics for such equilibria has been conducted by Nti [21] for contests with risk neutral players. Nti considers changing the size of the rent as well as the number of contestants. For reasons of space, we concentrate on the latter here. Let Y n denote the level of aggregate lobbying in the symmetric equilibrium, when the common production function f and utility function u satisfy assumptions A1 and A2, respectively. If a share function s exists, Y n satis…es n s (Y n ) = 1. Since s is strictly decreasing where positive, Y n is increasing in n. If f (x) = x, then expenditure and lobbying are identical, so aggregate expenditure increases with n.
If no share function exists, Y n is uniquely determined by the consistency requirement 1=n 2 S (Y n ). In contests where S need not be single-valued, this condition does not determine the ordering of Y m and Y n for m < n. If Y m Y n , the lobbying e¤ort of individuals falls as the size of the contest increases:
where y m is individual equilibrium lobbying. However, if Y m < Y n both numerator and denominator are ordered in the same way, so we need a deeper analysis to compare y m and y n . Nevertheless, a careful examination of the optimality conditions, conducted in the appendix, shows that we still have y m > y n in the (unique) symmetric equilibrium. Since f is strictly increasing by A1, we also have x m > x n .
Proposition 5.1 If A1 and A2 hold for all contestants in a symmetric contest, individual expenditures in the symmetric equilibrium decrease with the number of contestants. If, in addition, contestants are regular, aggregate lobbying increases and if, further, the contest success function is proportional, aggregate expenditure also increases.
General contests
In this subsection, we turn to asymmetric contests and assume throughout that all contestants are regular, so equilibria are unique. If an extra contestant enters such a contest, the aggregate share function increases. This increase is strict for values of Y smaller than the entrant's dropout value. If b Y , the pre-entry equilibrium value of Y , exceeds this dropout value, the entrant will be inactive and incumbents' equilibrium strategies will be unchanged. Otherwise, the new aggregate share function will exceed one at
Y . Since this function is strictly decreasing where positive, the new equilibrium value of Y exceeds b Y . Because individual share functions are non-increasing, the value of every share function decreases, strictly where positive. This implies that the probability that an active incumbent wins the contest falls and inactive incumbents remain inactive. In general, we cannot conclude from the increase in Y that aggregate expenditure on rentseeking: X = P n j=1 x j also increases because there is no direct relationship between Y and X. Of course, if the contest success function is proportional, then X = Y , so X increases even if contestants di¤er in their attitudes to risk.
No direct conclusion can be drawn about the e¤ect of an increase in Y on equilibrium strategies of individual contestants in asymmetric contests. This is because y i = Y s i (Y ) and s i decreases with Y so Y s i (Y ) need not be a monotonic function of Y . However, this does not prevent us from drawing conclusions about equilibrium payo¤s as shown by the following lemma, proved in the appendix. It follows that an increase in Y resulting from entry reduces the payo¤s of active incumbents. The following result summarizes our discussion.
Proposition 5.2
Suppose that a regular contestant enters a regular contest and is active in the new equilibrium.
1. Aggregate lobbying strictly increases.
2. If the contest success function is proportional, aggregate expenditure strictly increases.
3. For any incumbent, the probability of winning and the payo¤ fall. This fall is strict for an incumbent that was active before entry.
Dissipation
The standard Tullock [29] rent-seeking contest was devised to study how strategy a¤ects the proportion of the rent R dissipated in attempts to win the rent. Speci…cally, for any equilibrium b x of the contest, we de…ne the dissipation ratio
In a competitive free-entry model, the whole rent will be dissipated. In this section, we investigate the e¤ect of risk aversion on . Konrad and Schlesinger [14] …nd that the dissipation ratio in a symmetric contest with risk-averse contestants need not be smaller than that in the corresponding contest in which contestants are risk-neutral. However, a recent note by Treich [28] shows that is indeed smaller if contestants in the former contest are also prudent (u 0 i is convex). Here, we extend Treich's result to asymmetric contests.
If S i is the share correspondence of regular contestant i, we write s
for the share function of a risk-neutral contestant with the same production function 11 . It follows from the …rst-order conditions de…ning s i that, in an obvious modi…cation of the notation in (3) and (7) Proposition 6.1 Consider two contests with the same set of contestants and the same contest success function satisfying A2 for all contestants. Suppose all contestants satisfy A1 and are prudent in the …rst and risk neutral in the second.
1. If no contestant wins the …rst contest with probability greater than 1=2, equilibrium aggregate lobbying e¤ort is greater in the second contest.
2. If, in addition, the contest success function is proportional, aggregate expenditure is greater in the latter contest.
3. If the contest is symmetric, individual and aggregate expenditures are greater in the latter contest [28] .
The condition that b i 1=2 for all i holds in all equilibria of a contest in which there are at least two copies of each type of contestant and a fortiori in a symmetric contest. If contestants are strictly risk averse and winning probabilities are strictly less than 1=2, the comparisons in the proposition are strict.
A …ne-grained analysis of the e¤ects of risk aversion is possible in large contests and, in the remainder of this section, we study such contests. For ease of exposition, we assume throughout the remainder of this section that f 0 i (0) is …nite 12 for all i.
Symmetric contests
In a regular symmetric contest with n contestants, it follows from Lemma 4.1 that the common share function, s (Y ), is continuous, decreases strictly to 0 at the common dropout value:
and is equal to zero for Y > Y . The aggregate share function ns (Y ) inherits these properties. Since b Y n , the equilibrium value of Y , satis…es
where b x n and b X n are individual and aggregate expenditure and b y n is individual lobbying (in equilibrium). Since b
12 Note that, if f 0 i (0) = 1, an arbitrarily small perturbation of f i will have …nite slope at the origin. Speci…cally, e f i (x) = f i (x + ") satis…es e f 0 i (0) < 1 for any " > 0.
as n ! 1. Using g (0) = 0 and g
as n ! 1, where
A somewhat more involved argument, given in the appendix, shows that the latter conclusion is true even if contestants are not regular. Such contests may have multiple equilibria and therefore multiple values of the dissipation ratio. Nevertheless, if we select any one value for each n, the selected sequence tends to e [u].
Lemma 6.2 Let
n denote the dissipation ratio of an equilibrium of a symmetric contest in which the common production function f satis…es A1 and f 0 (0) < 1 and the common utility function u satis…es A2. Then
The limiting dissipation ratio e [u] is a measure of the curvature of the utility function. It can be viewed as the ratio of slope of the utility function between R and 0 to the slope at the origin. Concavity of u implies that e [u] increases to 1 (strictly if u is strictly concave) as R decreases to 0. This is consistent with the conclusions of Hillman and Katz [11] for competitive rent-seeking 13 . Indeed, if we plug a third-order Taylor's series expansion for u (R) into (16), we obtain
for some b R 2 (0; R). This agrees (with appropriate change of notation) with the expression found by Hillman and Katz. These authors go on to conduct a numerical investigation of rent dissipation in both competitive and strategic models. It can be con…rmed that e [u] agrees with the values that they …nd in both competitive and large strategic cases.
We have e [u] = 1 under risk neutrality and e [u] < 1 if u is strictly concave. Indeed, more risk averse behavior (in the Arrow-Pratt sense) results in less of the rent being dissipated. Speci…cally, suppose that there is a di¤erentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave 14 function such that u (z) = [u (z)] for all z. Strict concavity of implies
. 13 It also agrees with their strategic analysis, which assumes a proportional contest success function.
14 This can be weakened to concave and nonlinear in [0; R].
It follows that
Corollary 6.1 For n = 2; 3; : : : let n denote a dissipation ratio of a symmetric contest C n satisfying the assumptions of Lemma 6.2. Let n denote a dissipation ratio of a symmetric contest with the same contest success function as C n and in which the utility function satis…es A2 and represents more risk averse behavior than in C n . Then, n < n for all large enough n.
General contests
In a large asymmetric contest, Lemma 6.2 might suggest that dissipation would be an average of e [u] over all utility functions represented in the contest. However, there is an additional e¤ect to consider. Increasing the size of the contest has a selection e¤ect: contestants with smaller dropout values may be driven into inactivity. Hence, the limiting dissipation ratio need not be an average of e [u] over all utility functions in the contest. Rather, as the number of contestants increases, the selection e¤ect biases the distribution towards contestants with larger dropout values. We illustrate the point by considering a …nite set of production functions: f (1) ; : : : ; f (T ) satisfying A1 and f 0 (t) (0) < 1 for all t and utility functions: u (1) ; : : : ; u (T ) satisfying A2. We study a sequence of contests: e C n for n = 2; 3; : : : in each of which f i = f (t) , u i = u (t) (contestant i is of type t) for some t for each contestant i. We nest the contests by assuming that there are m t (n) contestants of type t in e C n , where m t (n + 1) m t (n) for t = 1; : : : ; T and P T t=1 m t (n) = n. Without loss of generality, we can label the types so that Y (t) Y (T ) for t = 1; : : : ; T 1, where
Contestants of type t, satisfying Y (t) < Y (T ) , are inactive in e C n once there are enough contestants of type T . To see this when a share function exists for all types, note that the share function for type T is strictly positive at
1 , the aggregate share function exceeds one at Y (t) . Since share functions are strictly decreasing where positive, the equilibrium value of Y exceeds Y (t) , so contestants of type t are inactive. Even if share correspondences are multi-valued, we can modify this argument along the lines of the proof of Lemma 9.2 in the Appendix, to deduce that there is a positive constant > 0 such that for all 2 S (T ) Y (t) . This implies that contestants of type t are inactive if m (T ) (n) > 1= . We conclude that, if Y (t) < Y (T ) for t = 1; : : : ; T 1, only contestants of type T are active once they are su¢ ciently numerous. We can therefore apply the results for symmetric contests to deduce that, the dissipation ratio approaches e u (T ) in this limit.
A complication with this argument arises if Y (t) = Y (T ) for some t 6 = T , for then the dropout value Y (t) depends on the marginal product f 0 (t) (0) as well as the limiting dissipation ratio. As a result, if e u (t) 6 = e u (T ) , a mixture of types t and T will remain active in the limit and the mix of types will a¤ect the limiting dissipation ratio. For simplicity of exposition, we ignore these complications by making the following assumption.
A3 Types are labelled so that for t = 1; : : :
Type labels can always be chosen so that this assumption holds if all production functions are identical (symmetric contest success function) or if all utility functions are identical. Generically, A3 can always be satis…ed: if f 0 (t) (0) and e u (t) are random draws from continuous distributions, the required labelling can be achieved with probability one.
Assuming A3 holds let T be the set of types satisfying Y (t) = Y (T ) . If m (T ) (n) ! 1 as n ! 1, the equilibrium value of Y approaches Y (T ) . This allows us to determine the limiting dissipation ratio, for if m (T ) (n) is su¢ ciently large that all types t = 2 T are inactive, the dissipation ratio is
shows that the sum on the right hand side is a convex combination of terms each of which approaches g 0 (T ) (0) as n ! 1. (These limits are a consequence of (15) for each type in T .) We 24 may deduce that the dissipation ratio approaches Y (T ) g 0 (T ) (0) =R = e u (T ) as n ! 1. Although we have assumed regularity in this argument, it is readily modi…ed to allow for irregular contestants and share correspondences. Proposition 6.2 Suppose f (t) satis…es f 0 (t) (0) < 1 and A1, u (t) satis…es A2 for t = 1; : : : ; T , A3 holds and m (T ) (n) ! 1. If n is a dissipation ratio of the contest e C n , for n = 2; 3; : : :, then n ! e (T ) u (T ) as n ! 1.
If f (t) = f (t 0 ) for all t; t 0 , contest success functions of e C n are symmetric and the ordering of dropout values is the same as that of limiting dissipation ratios 15 . If one type of contestant is more risk averse than another, the former will have a smaller dissipation ratio and therefore smaller dropout value. Hence, they will be inactive for all large enough n. For example, if the risk attitudes of all contestants in a large contest with symmetric contest success function can be ordered in the Arrow-Pratt sense, dissipation ratios approach the dissipation ratio of the least risk averse contestant. This generalizes a result previously obtained for contestants with constant absolute risk aversion [4] .
Conclusion
We have o¤ered a general treatment of common-value, incompletely discriminating contests in which contestants are risk averse. In particular, we show that, with risk averse contestants and production functions with nonincreasing returns, such contests have a Nash equilibrium. We also show that additional conditions are required to ensure that this equilibrium is unique and present several su¢ cient conditions for uniqueness. We study the effects of entry on aggregate lobbying and on incumbent contestants. Finally, we show that, in large contests, risk aversion reduces rent-seeking activity in both symmetric and asymmetric contests, though, in the latter, the effect may be o¤set by selection of active players in favor of less risk averse contestants. Similar conclusions may hold in smaller contests if we make additional assumptions: prudence and no contestant too large in equilibrium.
The techniques we have used above exploit the aggregative nature of the contest. A number of variations on the basic model also share this aggregative structure or are strategically equivalent to an aggregative game and can therefore potentially be addressed by the similar techniques. For example, Nti [21] introduces a "discount factor" in the form of an additive constant 15 In fact, we only need f 
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in the denominator of the contest success function (1): Baye and Hoppe [2] observe that certain patent races are strategically equivalent to this form by interpreting hazard rates as production functions. If lobbying e¤ort is used as the strategic variable, we still …nd that payo¤s depend only on own strategy and aggregate strategy. Skaperdas and Gan [26] allow for limited liability which has the e¤ect of making the payo¤ for losers independent of expenditure. This does not change the aggregative nature of the game. Konrad and Schlesinger [14] examine games in which the probability of winning is …xed but the size of the prize is a function of the expenditure pro…le. If this function takes a form similar to (1), the game is aggregative and may remain so when winning probabilities also depend on the expenditure pro…le, at least for some functional forms. The application of share correspondences and functions to such games awaits further investigation.
In Section 4, we presented a number of conditions ensuring uniqueness of equilibrium in contests with risk averse contestants and production functions satisfying A1. These appear to be some way from best possible. Cornes and Hartley [4] show that the equilibrium is unique if all contestants exhibit constant absolute risk aversion. The counterexample shows that this need no longer hold if the coe¢ cient of risk aversion is increasing. This suggests the conjecture that contests in which all contestants exhibit non-increasing absolute risk aversion have a unique equilibrium. It follows from the analysis above that, if, for each i and Y > 0, the marginal payo¤ i considered as a function of share has at most one zero for 2 [0; 1], contestant i is regular. Since i is negative at = 1, this holds if i is a quasiconvex function of . Numerical simulations for the case of constant relative risk aversion and covering a wide range of parameter values have all been consistent with quasi-convexity, even when the rent exceeds the bound in Corollary 4.1. However, we have not found a proof for this case, let alone the more general case of decreasing absolute risk aversion. To the best of our knowledge, the conjecture remains open.
Bibliography 9 Appendix
In this appendix, we give proofs postponed from above. The following expression for the derivative of A i , de…ned in (7), is used in several of these proofs and is recorded here for convenience: (17) Under assumptions A1 and A2, we deduce that
Proof of Lemma 3.1. It follows from (6) that
where A i (y; ) and D i (y) are given in the expressions (7) and (3). Hence,
using (17) to obtain the second equality. When @ i =@y = 0, the second derivative simpli…es to
and we can use (18) to conclude that @ 
From (18), A i1 0, which gives the …rst inequality below
in the remaining lines we have used (7) for the …rst equality, 
This can be rearranged to give the inequality in the Lemma.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Consider a sequence of numbers " m 2 (0; f i (R)) satisfying " m ! 0 as m ! 1. We start by modifying the contest by restricting the strategies of contestant i to satisfy " y i f i (R). Since payo¤s are continuous in all strategies and quasi-concave by Lemma 3.1, we can apply a standard existence theorem [7] 
has a …nite limit and D{
> 0 for all large enough m. This contradicts (19) .
The proof of Theorem 4.1 uses the following lemma, which is also used to establish Lemma 4.1. Proof. Using D i as de…ned in (3) and A i1 in (17), we have
Using (18): A i1 0, we …nd, after some rearrangement, 
where the …nal line uses the second equality in (17) . Substituting for D i , using i = 0, and rearranging gives
Since 
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Concavity of the utility function implies that the term in braces is nonpositive. So, considered as a function of , (y= ; ) crosses the axis in the interval [0; 1=2] at most once and from below. Since (ny n ; 1=n) = 0, we have ((n + 1) y n ; 1= (n + 1)) < 0. Also, (n + 1) y n+1 ; 1 n + 1 = 0, so Lemma 9.1 implies that y n > y n+1 .
Proof of Lemma 5. The proof of Lemma 6.2 exploits the following lemma, which can also be used to establish Proposition 6.2 when contestants are not regular. 
